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Back to the Future: The ‘New’ ENP towards the 
Southern Neighbourhood and the End of Ambition 
Tobias Schumacher 
The European Union’s (EU’s) release of the ‘new’ 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) on 18 November 
2015 is a turning point in Euro-Mediterranean relations 
and thus in the way the EU will henceforth be 
structuring its relations with its Southern 
neighbourhood. In fact, it marks the end of a period, 
stretching over almost two and a half decades, during 
which the EU was determined to politicise relations with 
its Arab neighbours and put the promotion of, and 
support for, reforms – both political and economic – at 
the centre of its policies.  
Ever since the Lisbon European Council was held in the 
summer of 1992, establishing what then was called the 
‘Euro-Maghreb Partnership’, and until the adoption of 
the ‘New Response for a Changing Neighbourhood’ in 
May 2011, Euro-Mediterranean relations followed a path 
of continuity. This continuity was marked by the fact that 
with every step towards a further institutionalisation of 
relations, the EU’s aspiration to contribute to democratic 
development, good governance, the rule of law, and the 
strengthening of human rights in its Southern 
neighbourhood became more salient. In fact, it provided 
EU policies towards Europe’s Southern periphery with 
their normative raison d’être.  
The ‘new’ ENP, presented by EU High 
Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini and 
EU Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement 
Johannes Hahn in the European Parliament after one year 
of discussions and four months of unprecedented public 
consultations, puts an abrupt end to this. While many 
Arab regimes, after years of either suspicion towards or 
outright rejection of EU democracy promotion efforts, 
are overwhelmingly rejoicing at this development, it is a 
blow for reform actors in the Southern neighbourhood 
and for anyone who was hoping that the EU was serious 
with its normative approach. Strictly speaking, the ‘new’ 
ENP is a step back when compared to its two 
predecessors, the revised ENP of 2011 and the original 
ENP of 2003/2004, as it invariably leads to the 
substantiation of and thus support for autocratic rule in 
the EU’s Southern neighbourhood.  
In recent years, one of the most frequently used terms in 
Brussels and EU member states’ capitals has been the so-
called ‘ring of fire’, replacing the often-cited reference to 
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the ‘ring of friends’ that the EU originally intended to 
foster via the ENP. Coined by The Economist in the 
summer of 2014 with a view to describing developments 
in the EU’s neighbourhoods – South and East – and their 
potentially devastating spill-over effects for the EU, 
European decision-makers did not waste any time to 
engage with this seemingly all-encompassing term. As a 
matter of fact, over the past 18 months discursive 
engagement with the ‘ring of fire’ led to the creation of a 
narrative that has been revolving around the notion of 
crisis. This, at the end of the day, motivated Jean-Claude 
Juncker upon taking office as Commission President to 
call for yet another overhaul of the ENP. Thus, while the 
2011 review was supposed to provide EU-neighbourhood 
relations with a more forward-looking and sustainable 
framework in response to the Arab uprisings, the recent 
revision was driven almost exclusively by a general 
perception among policy-makers in Brussels and EU 
member states’ capitals that the EU’s neighbourhood is in 
a state of crisis.  
Obviously, the conflicts in Ukraine, Syria and Libya, the 
rise of ISIS/Da’esh and corresponding waves of internal 
and external displacement seem to confirm this view. 
Yet, external volatilities, crises, conflicts and the violation 
of territorial integrity, have been key characteristics of 
the EU’s periphery already at the time when Brussels 
decided to label the immediate space beyond its external 
borders ‘neighbourhood’ and in fact ever after. In other 
words, though crises and wars have been a defining 
feature of the EU’s neighbourhood for years, it needed 
newly emerging conflicts and conflict-related 
developments – and thus a more tangible understanding 
that these can and do affect the EU – for the ENP to 
emerge back in the spotlight.  
Due to the rather lengthy and admittedly inclusive public 
consultation process that the Commission and the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) initiated, the EU, 
and with it the ENP, had the chance to escape the fate of 
decisions that normally, when taken in a context of crisis, 
tend to suffer from limited time to explore or appreciate 
alternative courses of action. However, the Commission’s 
and the EEAS’s determination to put forward a revised 
policy framework that would find the consensus of both 
the member states and the neighbours and that would at 
the same time resonate with and relate to crises, led to 
an outcome that reflects rather strongly the interests and 
preferences that Arab regimes had voiced in recent 
months. Put differently, the objective of pleasing both EU 
member states and governmental partners in the two 
neighbourhoods meant ‘squaring the circle’ and, given 
the reform aversion of most Southern neighbourhood 
regimes, could not but result in a major downgrading of 
the future ENP’s ambition. 
Downgrading the EU’s ambitions in the Southern 
neighbourhood 
The downgrading of the EU’s ambitions vis-à-vis its 
Southern neighbourhood becomes particularly visible in 
three domains, which are the cornerstones of the ‘new’ 
ENP: stabilisation, ownership and differentiation. 
Stabilisation  
The ‘new’ ENP puts the focus on the stabilisation of the 
EU’s neighbourhood. This has been one of the core 
objectives of the ENP since it was initiated in 2003, 
though the extent to which it was linked to polity- and 
governance-related reforms through conditionality varied 
throughout the years. The ‘new’ ENP abolishes this link 
and with it any reference to positive (‘more for more’) or 
negative (‘less for less’) conditionality – after all the key 
features of the 2011 ENP. Instead, it is predicated rather 
explicitly on the assumption that holding on to, and 
strengthening ‘partners’ – a euphemism for non-
democratic regimes in the Southern neighbourhood – is 
conducive to containing instability. At a time when many 
of these regimes are preoccupied with consolidating their 
autocratic rule in a post-‘Arab Spring’ context and are 
increasingly regarded as the lesser evil when contrasted 
with potential unrest, state collapse and radicalism, this 
approach – as pragmatic as it might be – is an antithesis 
to what past editions of the ENP were supposed to be 
about. At best, it merely indicates that the EU, by evoking 
the crisis narrative embodied in the ‘ring of fire’ notion, 
simply found a way of legitimating the de facto 
supremacy of inter-governmental relations over 
democracy promotion with potentially uncertain 
outcomes. At worst, it is destined to aggravate rather 
than soften the multi-facetted problems that the ‘new’ 
ENP claims to address, as the absence of democratic rule 
and the continuous violation of political, social and 
economic rights by Arab regimes are in fact the root 
causes of instability, radicalisation and conflict. 
Ownership  
In addition to stabilisation, the Review of 18 November 
2015, outlining the ‘new’ ENP, stipulates that “greater 
mutual ownership will be the hallmark of the new ENP”. 
Principally, this decision represents an overdue 
acknowledgement of neighbours’ past calls for putting an 
end to what they perceived as a centre-periphery 
approach that treated them as mere objects. However, 
stepping up ownership, as was explicitly requested by the 
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EU’s Arab neighbours in their Beirut paper of 24 June 
2015, comes with a cost. Allowing the neighbours to have 
a much stronger say and let them decide what the EU 
policy in its entirety towards each one of them should 
entail, does effectively boil down to formally legitimating 
them to determine the actual scope of EU and thus ENP-
related policies.  
Some might consider this to be a receptive and realistic 
response to the general reluctance of the Arab regimes in 
the Mediterranean to engage in meaningful political, that 
is democratic reform. In reality, however, such a view is 
whitewash and has wide-ranging implications. First, it 
poses questions as to whether the EU is, and still wants 
to be, an autonomous foreign policy actor in its Southern 
neighbourhood. Secondly, by putting in place a policy 
that aims at reflecting the interests and aspirations of its 
Southern ‘partners’, in conjunction with the abolition of 
the ‘less for less principle’, the EU does not only 
surrender to the long-standing demands of autocratic 
rulers. What is worse, it signals that they can get away 
with their notorious human rights violations and 
authoritarian practices, knowing that – as the ‘new’ ENP 
explicitly allows them to choose from a broad and 
politically rather non-sensitive à la carte menu – they 
will, after all, even be rewarded with ‘more for less’. 
‘Letting the fox guard the chickens’ therefore seems to 
have been the leitmotif of Brussels when it drafted the 
‘new’ ENP.   
Differentiation  
“[R]ecognising that not all partners aspire to EU rules and 
standards, and reflecting the wishes of each country 
concerning the nature and focus of its partnership with 
the EU”, the ‘new’ ENP also promises even greater 
differentiation than was already the case in the past. 
However, the Review omits any clear reference as to 
what differentiation shall truly mean and entail, other 
than that the EU is intent on allowing the neighbours to 
cherry-pick. In fact, what the ‘new’ ENP offers is much of 
the same of what its previous versions also already had 
on display: at least at this stage. Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs), mobility 
partnerships and sectoral integration, as well as financial 
and development assistance, are the cornerstones of this 
allegedly reinforced differentiation approach. However, 
to what extent Arab neighbours would eventually benefit 
from these depends on whether they opt for them at all 
and, secondly, whether the offers would address their 
specific needs and thus really differentiate. At least as far 
as the DCFTAs are concerned, a comparison with those 
currently to be implemented by the EU’s Eastern 
neighbours Georgia and Moldova might give Arab 
neighbours a foretaste of what can be expected as these 
DCFTAs were modelled considerably on Ukraine’s DCFTA 
– in spite of the three countries’ different trade and 
economic structures and regulatory systems. Conversely, 
the fact that Tunisia was given a new Action Plan for the 
period 2013-2017 already before the adoption of the 
‘new’ ENP, and Lebanon a Single Support Framework for 
2014-2016, while Egypt was only granted a one-year 
Single Support Framework (2014-2015), is indicative of 
the fact that differentiation might also take a rather 
different turn in practice.  Though it is known that 
development plans by external donors have the greatest 
potential to generate at least some impact when they are 
concluded for a period of three to five years, the EU 
decided to differentiate between Tunisia and Lebanon on 
one hand and Egypt on the other hand and in spite of the 
fact that Egypt’s development-related needs are 
disproportionately larger and considerably more capital-
intensive. 
Back to the future: the absence of vision in the EU’s 
relations with its Southern neighbourhood  
It took the EU years, if not decades to develop a 
democracy, governance and rights-related ambition and 
thus acquis in its neighbourhood relations. Although the 
first two ENP editions had multi-facetted shortcomings 
and suffered from EU member states’ lack of interest, 
they represented a major advance in the EU’s external 
relations framework. This is mainly because they 
reflected the aspirations of an actor that increasingly 
claimed to be a ‘normative power’ that focused, at least 
on the level of political rhetoric and in official discourses, 
on the transposition of its values. In contrast, the ‘new’ 
ENP is an acknowledgement not only of the ENP’s past 
failures, but also of the EU’s inability and, so it seems, 
unwillingness to hold on to its values and principles when 
the going gets tough and when crisis seems to have 
become the ‘new normal’. Thus, the lack of vision in the 
process of European integration generally, apparent 
already for many years, has finally also infected the ENP.  
Apart from the negative repercussions this is bound to 
have for the EU’s self-image as a determined, sovereign 
and normative foreign policy actor and for how it is being 
perceived by others, especially by neighbours and other 
external actors in the Southern neighbourhood, the lack 
of vision in EU-neighbourhood relations is particularly 
problematic for reform-minded neighbours. For example, 
the ‘new’ ENP continues to omit any reference to what 
Tunisia – the only beacon of democratic light in an 
otherwise politically stagnating or rather turbulent 
Southern neighbourhood – can expect from the EU at the 
end of a rather long and costly process of approximation 
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with, and adoption and implementation of EU laws, rules 
and regulations. Admittedly, the ‘new’ ENP has a strong 
focus on sector- and issue area-specific cooperation 
beyond the sphere of democratic reform. Yet, it provides 
rather few leads as to how this shall materialise or – in 
the case of those, such as Morocco, Tunisia and to a 
lesser extent Jordan, that have already embarked on 
broad sectoral cooperation – be deepened. This is also 
visible in the ‘new’ ENP’s security dimension which, in 
spite of its rather long list of priorities, does not offer 
much, neither with regard to stepping up the EU’s 
involvement in the resolution of conflicts nor as far as 
securing greater commitment on the part of the EU 
member states is concerned.  
Given the policy’s overall focus on stabilisation this does 
not resemble a forward-oriented approach that is 
destined to contribute to the pacification of the EU’s 
Southern – and Eastern, for that matter – 
neighbourhood. Instead, the EU seems to be set to travel 
‘back to the future’, letting those that the original policy 
was primarily oriented at, notably non-democratic 
regimes with no EU membership perspective, decide over 
the direction this journey will take. 
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